Introduction
Until now, the empirical analysis of auction data has been confined to either the independent private value (IPV) paradigm or pure common value (CV) paradigm. See e.g., Hansen (1985) , Paarsch (1992) , Elyakime et al. (1994 Elyakime et al. ( , 1997 , Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) for the IPV paradigm, and Smiley (1979) , Hoffman and Marsden (1986) , Theil (1988) , Giliberto and Varaiya (1989), Paarsch (1992) , and the work of Hendricks and Porter surveyed in Porter (1995) for the pure CV paradigm.
For instance, the former paradigm is used in timber auctions while the latter is used in gas lease auctions. These two paradigms rely upon strong assumptions that restrict their applications to real situations. On one hand, the IPV model assumes that the value of the auctioned object for each bidder is known to himself but not to other bidders' whose valuations are independent. On the other hand, the CV model assumes that the value of the auctioned object is the same but unknown to all bidders who have different (private) estimates of this common value. In particular, the IPV model recognizes differences in individuals' preferences, while the CV model does not. However, the independence of private valuations in the IPV model can be unrealistic. Thus many auctions situations may not correspond to either one of these two polar cases.
In this paper we consider the structural estimation of the symmetric affiliated private value (APV) model. Formally, the symmetric APV model is a special case of the symmetric affiliated value (AV) model developed by Wilson (1977) , where the utility of each bidder is a function of its own private signal and of an unknown common value, and where the private signals and common value are drawn from an affiliated distribution. 1 The AV model encompasses a large class of models, which includes the IPV and CV models. Though it is also a special case of the AV model, a noteworthy feature of the APV model is that, for any given level of competition, any symmetric AV model is observationally equivalent in terms of bids to some symmetric APV model (see Laffont and Vuong (1996) ). 2 Under these conditions, the APV model can be viewed as the most general model for analyzing bids. In particular, the IPV model is a special case of the APV model, while any CV model is observationally equivalent to some APV model. 1 A somewhat more general framework was proposed by Milgrom and Weber (1982) , where the utility depends also on the signals of the other bidders.
2 Two models are observationally equivalent given observed bids if they lead to the same bid distribution. See Definition 1 below. Though models can be observationally equivalent in explaining bids, they can have quite different implications on policy recommendations.
We adopt a structural approach as developed by Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) and Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) . Specifically, this approach allows us to recover the joint distribution of private values, which is the main structural element in the APV model and is useful for various economic policy issues. For instance, this approach enables the analyst to assess the strength of the affiliation among private values and hence, the validity of the IPV model. As is well known, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem no longer holds in the APV model so that different auction mechanisms do not generate the same expected revenue for the seller, unlike in the IPV model. See Vickrey (1961) for the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. 3 Second, an estimate of the joint distribution of private values is useful for determining the optimal reservation price. See Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2002) . Lastly, our method also allows the analyst to estimate the magnitude of the informational rents and hence to assess the optimality of the auction mechanism from the point of view of the seller.
In this paper, we establish the nonparametric identification of the APV model from observed bids, and we characterize the theoretical restrictions imposed by the model so as to assess its validity on bid data. We then propose a consistent and computationally convenient two-step nonparametric method for estimating the underlying distribution of interest. In particular, our procedure extends Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) results to the APV case. To illustrate how to implement our estimation procedure, we consider the design in Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) to simulate bids data. We then provide a step by step guide for implementing our procedure while assessing the properties of our estimator in small samples. In particular, we investigate the consequences of postulating incorrectly independence of private values on the estimates of the equilibrium strategies and the latent distributions of private values. As an example of policy conclusions, we consider the effects on estimating the informational rents left to the winners.
Our paper contributes to the new structural analysis of auction data. Until now, structural empirical work on auctions has been limited by the high numerical complexity associated with the nonlinearity of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy of the game. Some attractive features of our method are that it is computationally straightforward and does not require parametric 3 Experiments conducted by Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) indicate that an English or second-price auction dominates a first-price auction in the APV paradigm. In the general AV model, Milgrom and Weber (1982) prove that the English auction dominates the second-price auction, which in turn dominates the Dutch and first-price auctions.
assumptions on the latent distribution. Second, while the recently developed structural approach has been confined to the IPV and CV models, our paper shows that the structural approach can be extended to a more general paradigm, namely the APV paradigm. Hence our methodology can be used to reexamine auctions that have been analyzed exclusively within the IPV and CV paradigms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the APV model. We establish its nonparametric identifiability from observed bids and we propose a consistent two-step nonparametric procedure for estimating the underlying joint and marginal distributions of private values.
Section 3 is devoted to the description of the experimental design and to the discussion of our findings. Some concluding remarks are gathered in Section 4. Proofs are included in an appendix.
The APV model and the structural approach
In this section, we first briefly present the APV model. We then address the identification of the model from observed bids and we characterize the restrictions imposed by the theory on the observed bid distribution. Lastly, we propose a convenient and consistent two-step nonparametric procedure for estimating the structural element(s) of the APV model.
The APV model
The APV model is a special case of the Affiliated Value (AV) model introduced by Wilson (1977) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) . We first present the AV model.
A single and indivisible object is auctioned to n bidders who are assumed to be risk neutral.
The utility of each potential buyer i, i = 1, . . . , n, for the object is
is increasing in both arguments, v i denotes the i-th player's private signal or information, and c represents a common component or value affecting all utilities. The vector (v 1 , . . . , v n , c) is viewed as a realization of a random vector whose (n + 1)-dimensional cumulative distribution function is
F(·).
The latter is assumed to be affiliated with a support [v, v] n × [c, c] where v ≥ 0 and a density f (·) with respect to Lebesgue measure. 4 Intuitively, affiliation implies that large values for some of the components make the other components more likely to be large than small. In particular, it implies that a bidder who evaluates the object highly will expect others to evaluate the object 4 The constraint v ≥ 0 defines implicitly the population of bidders at the time of the auctions. For a definition of affiliation, see Milgrom and Weber (1982 We consider first-price sealed-bid auctions with at least two bidders, i.e. n ≥ 2. As usual, we restrict our attention to strictly increasing differentiable symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies. At such an equilibrium, player i chooses his bid
is the equilibrium strategy, p 0 denotes a posted reserve price, and E[·|v i ] denotes the expectation with respect to all random elements conditional upon v i . When the reservation price is nonbinding, i.e. p 0 ≤ v, the equilibrium strategy satisfies the first-order differential equation
for all v i ∈ [v, v] subject to the boundary condition s(v) = v, where F y 1 |v 1 (·|·) denotes the conditional distribution of y 1 given v 1 , f y 1 |v 1 (·|·) its density, and the index "1" refers to any bidder among the 5 See Campo, Perrigne and Vuong (2001) for the asymmetric case within the APV paradigm. The main difficulty with asymmetric auctions is that the equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations. 6 One can model such an affiliation by assuming that private values are independent conditionally upon a common component, namely vi = vηi where v and the ηis are mutually independent. Identification and estimation become more involved as they are related to measurement error and deconvolution problems. See Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) .
n bidders because all bidders are ex ante identical. 7 Straightforward computations show that
, where f (·) denotes the marginal density of v i . From Milgrom and Weber (1982) , the solution is
where
One can easily verify that b i = s(v i ) is strictly increasing in v i on [v, v] whenever F y 1 |v 1 (·|u) is strictly increasing.
Nonparametric identification and theoretical restrictions
The structural approach relies upon the hypothesis that observed bids are the equilibrium bids of the auction model under consideration. Because the reservation price is nonbinding, all potential bidders will bid. Moreover, they will bid according to the equilibrium strategy (2). Formally, this means that, given a n-dimensional joint distribution F(·) of private valuations, the structural econometric model for one auction is
where we have explicitly indicated the dependence on F of the equilibrium strategy. In particular, because private signals are unobserved and random, bids are naturally random with a n-dimensional joint distribution G(·) that is determined by the structural elements of the model. In the present case, the only structural element is F(·) since the APV model is entirely defined by the joint distribution F(·) of bidders' private values. A salient feature of (3) is that the equilibrium bid distribution G(·) depends on the underlying distribution F(·) in two ways: (i) through the unobservable v i , which is jointly drawn with other bidders' private values from F(·), and (ii) through the equilibrium strategy, which is a complex functional of F (see (2)). This specific feature of auction models complicates the analysis of identification and the characterization of theoretical restrictions to which we now turn.
Usually, all bidders' private values are unknown to the analyst while only their bids are observed.
Thus the identification of the APV model reduces to whether F(·) can be determined uniquely from observed bids. Regarding theoretical restrictions, the issue is whether the structural econometric 7 Throughout the paper we assume that the second-order conditions are always satisfied. The existence of a distribution F(·) that can rationalize an observed bid distribution G(·) is related to whether the APV model imposes some restrictions on observed bids, while its uniqueness is related to the ability of discriminating among competing APV structures for explaining observed bids. Because no parametric restrictions are made on the underlying structure F(·), the preceding definition and hence our results concerning identification and theoretical restrictions are nonparametric in nature. See Roehrig (1988) for a general definition of identification. It is important to note that these concepts allow the distribution F(·) and the observed number of bidders n to vary together. In particular, our framework includes the case where n is the equilibrium outcome of an entry game in which private values are drawn from F(·) after the bidders' decision to entry (see McAfee and McMillan (1987) ). In this case, n is determined by F(·), while the identification still relates to the uniqueness of F(·) given n and (b 1 , . . . , b n ) distributed as G(·).
Denote the conditional distribution of B 1 given b 1 by G B 1 |b 1 (·|·) and its density by g B 1 |b 1 (·|·).
We note that
It follows that
Hence, using the last two equations and v = s −1 (b), the first-order differential equation (1) can be written equivalently as
A distinctive feature of (4) is that each private value can be expressed as a function of its corresponding bid as well as the distribution and density of observed bids without solving the differential equation (1). This constitutes the crucial observation upon which our identification result and estimation procedure rest. 8
The next proposition shows that the APV model is (nonparametrically) identified, i.e. that all APV structures are identified according to Definition 1. It also gives a necessary and sufficient condition on the distribution G(·) of the observed bids for the existence of the latent distribution 
Proposition 1 is important for many reasons. First, Laffont and Vuong (1996) noted that the general AV model is not identified from observed bids only and that any AV model is observationally equivalent to some APV model. Thus there is no loss in explaining bids by restricting the set of models to APV models. In particular, as noted in Laffont and Vuong (1996) , any pure CV model is observationally equivalent to an APV model. In this sense, the APV model does not exclude a priori the CV model by allowing for affiliation among private valuations. Second, Proposition 1 states that the symmetric APV model is identified. The combination of these results shows that the APV model constitutes the most general framework identified from observed bids only for analyzing auction data within a structural approach. Third, because it is nonparametric, our identification result does not require any a priori parametric specification on the underlying distribution. Until now, the structural approach has mainly relied on a parametric specification of the bidders' private value distribution. As is well known, parametric identification does not imply nonparametric identification. In other words, parametric identification may be achieved through misspecified parametric specifications.
Proposition 1 also characterizes all the game-theoretic restrictions imposed by the symmetric APV model on the distribution of observed bids. Specifically, it provides a necessary and sufficient 8 Equation (4) becomes more complicated with a binding reservation price. Identification and estimation become more involved, see Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) for the IPV case. See also Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter (2000) using an equation similar to (4) where the left-hand side has a different interpretation in a CV environment.
condition for the existence of a joint distribution of bidders' private values that can rationalize the distribution of observed bids. In our opinion, the most striking aspect is the existence of such conditions. Indeed they imply that any distribution of observed bids may not be rationalized by the APV model despite the generality of the model, as noted above. In particular, the fact that bidders adopt the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy (2) imposes some restrictions on the distribution of observed bids in the form of the monotonicity of the function ξ(·, G). Hence this monotonicity can be used to test whether agents can be viewed as behaving according to game theory within the maintained affiliated structure. As we will show, ξ(·, G) can be estimated nonparametrically.
Hence this Lastly, it is interesting to note that, provided one knows G(·), one has neither to solve the differential equation (1) nor to apply numerical integration in (2) so as to determine s(·). For knowledge of G(·) and hence of ξ(·, G) determines the private value v for any given bid b through (4). This is important because our procedure circumvents the computational difficulties encountered frequently in the structural analysis of auction data due to the fact that the differential equation characterizing the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy cannot be solved explicitly in many auction models or, when this can be done, that the solution is highly nonlinear in the latent distribution as in (2). Equation (4) forms the basis upon which the nonparametric estimation procedure proposed in the next subsection rests. 9
Nonparametric structural estimation
Our main goal is to estimate the joint density f (·) of bidders' private values as well as its univariate marginal density f (·). We first consider the joint density. Basically, if one knew G B 1 |b 1 (·|·) and g B 1 |b 1 (·|·), then one could use (4) to recover the private values for all bidders so as to estimate f (·) from these affiliated private values. However, G B 1 |b 1 (·|·) and g B 1 |b 1 (·|·) are unknown, but they can 9 Alternatively, approximating the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy by polynomials as recently proposed by Armantier, Florens and Richard (1998) be estimated from observed bids. Extending Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) , this suggests the following two-step estimation procedure.
• Step 1. Construct a sample of pseudo private values based on (4) using nonparametric estimates of G B 1 |b 1 (·|·) and g B 1 |b 1 (·|·) from observed bids.
• Step 2. Use the pseudo sample constructed in Step 1 to estimate nonparametrically the joint density of bidders' private values.
We present our estimation method for the case where there is no heterogeneity across auctions.
Our method can be readily extended to include explanatory variables associated with auctioned objects' characteristics, in which case the latent distribution of interest is the joint distribution of privates values conditional upon those characteristics. 10
Let n be a given number of bidders. Let L n be the number of auctions corresponding to the chosen n, and let index the -th auction, = 1, . . . , L n . In the first step, using the observed bids
for an arbitrary value (B, b) where h G and h g are some bandwidths, K G and K g are kernels, and
1I(·)
is the indicator function of the event in parentheses. Then, using (4) we can obtain estimates of the unobserved private values v i aŝ
As a matter of fact, some trimming has to be introduced because the density g B 1 ,b 1 (·, ·) is not well estimated near the boundaries. The trimming will be explained in Section 3.
10 Let Z ∈ IR d be a vector of characteristics of the auctioned objects. Thus (5) and (6) 
. , vn|z).
In the second step, we use the pseudo sample
for any value (v 1 , . . . , v n ) where h f is a bandwidth, and K f is a kernel. Since we assume that F(·)
as well as f (·) is symmetric, we impose the symmetry of our nonparametric density estimate by averaging (8) on the n! permutations of the desired evaluation point (v 1 , . . . , v n ). For instance,
The next proposition establishes the uniform consistency of our two-step nonparametric estimatorf (·, . . . , ·) and hence off S (·, . . . , ·). Proof: See the Appendix with formal assumptions.
and the cs are constants.
As is well known, the optimal uniform convergence rate for estimating f (·, . . . , ·) when private Stone (1982) . Proposition 2 indicates that our two-step nonparametric estimator converges at a slower rate, but this is expected as the true private values are not available and need to be estimated. For instance, when R = 2 and n = 2, our estimator converges at the rate (L n / log L n ) 2/15 while Stone's optimal but unattainable rate is
. The optimal rate of uniform convergence for estimating f (·, . . . , ·) from observed bids cannot be obtained following the argument in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000, Theorem 2), which no longer holds. 11
The preceding proposition provides an estimate of the n-dimensional joint density f (·, . . . , ·) for each n = 2, 3, . . .. In addition to the n-dimensional joint density f (·), it is frequently informative to estimate its univariate marginal density f n (·), as the latter can be easily graphed and compared.
Indeed, comparison of the estimated marginal densitiesf n (·) across n provides information on how the underlying structure varies with n. To do so, we use the pseudo sample {v i , i = 1, . . . , n; = 1, . . . , L n } contructed from (7) to estimate nonparametrically the marginal density f n (·) bŷ
for any value v where h m is a bandwidth, and K m is a univariate kernel. The next proposition establishes the uniform consistency of the nonparametric estimator (9) for the marginal density f n (·). Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3: Let h G and h g be as in Proposition 2, and
on any inner compact subset of the support of f n (·).
Note that, though the vanishing rate of h m is the same as that of h f in Proposition 2, the convergence rate off n (·) is faster than that off (·, . . . , ·). A remark similar to that after Proposition 2 applies here as well regarding the rate of convergence. Note also that if the estimated marginal densitiesf n (·) are similar across n, then this would suggest that the underlying structure does not depend on n. In this case, we can pool the pseudo private values obtained from different sizes n to estimate the marginal density f (·) assumed to be independent of n. See Section 3 for an illustration.
The nonparametric estimation method we propose here is fully structural. It has several advantages over parametric structural methods such as those developed by Paarsch (1992) , Donald and Paarsch (1993) , Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) for the pure CV and IPV models. Because it is nonparametric, our method does not require any prior parametric specification on either G(·)
or F(·). Instead it lets the data reveal the underlying distribution. Therefore economic conclusions based on our nonparametric method are robust to misspecification of this distribution. This agrees with McAfee and Vincent (1992) who argue that policy conclusions should be distribution free in view of the lack of any a priori guidance about the latent distribution. Such a feature is especially useful in the APV model as affiliation can be difficult to specify parametrically. Moreover, the determination of f y 1 |v 1 (·|·) and F y 1 |v 1 (·|·), which are required in (2), involves multidimensional integration. Hence, a significant practical advantage of our method is that it does not require the computation of the equilibrium strategy for each auction and each trial value of the parameters as in Paarsch (1992) and Donald and Paarsch (1993) for the IPV model. As is well known, computa-tional difficulties can constitute a serious or even stumbling obstacle in the structural analysis of auction data, especially when the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy cannot be obtained explicitly.
A step by step guide using simulated bids
The main purpose of this section is to provide a step by step guide on how to implement our procedure in practice. To do so, we use simulated bids data following the design in Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) . This will allow us to assess the properties of our procedure in small samples in terms of the latent density of private values and winners' informational rents. Moreover, we investigate the consequences of estimating an IPV model when private values are actually affiliated.
The experimental design
Our experimental design draws from Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) in their laboratory study of first-price auctions with affiliated private values. The design is simple leading to explicit equilibrium strategies that can be nevertheless quite complex. Let n be the number of bidders. For each auction, private values are generated according to The private values are affiliated through γ and the correlation between any pair of private values is
We let a = .25, b = .75 and = .25 so that the support of private values [v, v] 
Thus the correlation between two private values is equal to .5. It can be shown that the corresponding marginal density of private values is triangular and given by
See Simon (2000) . Note that this density is not differentiable at v = .5.
To simulate bids, we need to determine the equilibrium strategy (2). Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) give the equilibrium strategy on the intervals Specifically,
for i = 1, . . . , n. Thus the equilibrium strategy is linear on [0, .5]. For n = 2, it can be shown that the equilibrium strategy (10) extends to the upper half [.5, 1], i.e.
On the other hand, for n = 3, the equilibrium strategy is nonlinear and given by
See Simon (2000) . Note that equilibrium strategies can be very complex despite the simplicity of the experimental design. In general, a parametric specification of the latent distribution of private values in the APV case, such as a multivariate log-normal with positive correlation, lead to intractable equilibrium strategies. Our method avoids such a difficulty by circumventing the computation of the strategies.
Next we draw independently 100 pairs of private values (v 1 , v 2 ), = 1, . . . , 100 as well as 100 triplets (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ), = 1, . . . , 100 using the above design. This gives us 200 auctions, which corresponds to realistic auction data sizes. We then compute the corresponding equilibrium bids using (10), (11) and (12) according to n = 2 or 3 and the values v i . This gives us a total of 200 + 300 = 500 bids. These simulated bids are used to implement our procedure, which provides for each n estimates of the inverse equilibrium strategy ξ(·), the marginal density f (·) and the winners' informational rents. This allows us to explain precisely the procedure and its practical aspects as well as to assess the adequacy of our estimates. To this end, we replicate this experiment 1,000 times and provide the median and a 90% confidence interval of our estimators.
Practical issues
As is usually the case in practice, we assume that the analyst only observes the bids, i. tively. The purpose of this section is to give a detailed guide for implementing our procedure to estimate bidders' inverse equilibrium strategies and their latent distribution. Moreover, we will be able to compare the estimated functions with their true counterparts. Recall that our procedure has to be performed for each size n: The distribution of observed bids depends on the level of competition so that the distribution G B 1 |b 1 (·|·) and density g B 1 |b 1 (·|·) depend on n. Hereafter, the differentiability order R of the latent joint density f (·) is assumed to be equal to 2 to satisfy the condition in Proposition 2 for n = 2, 3. 12
The first step of the procedure consists in estimating G B 1 ,b 1 (·, ·) and g B 1 ,b 1 (·, ·) at arbitrary value b according to (5) and (6) where B = b. For instance, when n = 2,
In nonparametric kernel estimation, the choice of the kernel does not have much effect in practice. In our case, we choose a kernel with compact support that is continuously differentiable on its support including the boundaries to satisfy the theoretical assumptions in the appendix. A large class of kernel functions satisfy these properties (see Hardle (1991) ). It is the case for the triweight kernel defined as
The triweight kernel is of order 2. The kernel K G (·) in (5) is identical to (13) while the kernel (6) is defined as the product of two triweight kernels. For n = 2, K G (·) and K g (·) defined as above are of order 2 as required in Assumption A.2(iii). For n = 3, these kernels should be in principle of order 3. As is well known, a kernel of order 3 entails negative density estimates in some regions and hence some pseudo private values smaller than their corresponding bids. To avoid such a problem, we use kernels of order 2 even when n = 3.
In contrast, the choice of bandwidths requires more attention. We use bandwidths of the form The joint density f (·) in our experimental design is not differentiable, i.e. R = 0, whenever one of its arguments is equal to .5. Because the misspecification is local, we expect that this does not have much effect. This is confirmed by our results presented later.
kernel instead of the Gaussian kernel (see Hardle (1991) ).
We can now compute the pseudo private values using (7). In particular, for each observed bid b i
Note that applying (7) for a set of chosen values b traces out an estimate of the function ξ(·), which is the inverse equilibrium strategy. As shown in Proposition 1, this function should be strictly increasing in b for the observed bid distribution to be rationalized by an APV model. 14 As is well known, kernel density estimators are subject to some boundary effects, i.e. densities are not well estimated (biased) close to the boundaries of their support. Thus, we expect that private values are not well estimated when their corresponding bids are close to 0 or s(1) in our experimental design. To mitigate such effects, we use a trimming similar to that in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) . Specifically, for each n In the second step, the n-dimensional joint density f (·) is estimated using (8) at any arbitrary n-uplet (v 1 , . . . , v n ). We choose the kernel K f (·) to be the product of n triweight kernels (13). This kernel is of order 2. Moreover, note that, if one of the pseudo private valuesv i is infinite according to the trimming rule (14), then the value of the kernel becomes zero because of the finiteness of the support of K f (·). Consequently, all the pseudo private values of the corresponding auction are dropped in the second step. Let L T be the number of auctions remaining after trimming. The estimator (8) of the joint density f (·) is then computed using L T in place of L. 15 Regarding the
c f s are some constants. The term n! arises from the symmetrization of (8). The constant c f is 13 When the empirical bid distribution is very skewed, it is recommended to apply a logarithmic transformation such as log(1 + b i ). In this case, (5) and (6) still hold using D i ≡ log(1 + B i ) and
and b i , respectively. On the other hand, (7) is replaced byv i exp(
14 The affiliation of the bid distribution as required by Proposition 1-(i) can be tested using the Blum, Kiefer and Rosenblatt (1961) test for independence.
15 Asymptotically, LT /L tends to one as hg vanishes.
determined by the rule of thumb, namely c f = 2.978 × 1.06σv, whereσv is the empirical standard deviation of the nL T trimmed pseudo private values. Regarding the symmetrization of the density estimate, averaging (8) over the n! permutations of (v 1 , . . . , v n ) simplifies because of the product form of the kernel K f (·). For instance, when n = 2,f S (v 1 , v 2 ) can be computed aŝ
A similar simplication applies when n = 3.
As indicated in Section 2, it is interesting to estimate the marginal density of private values for each size n as well as to pool all the pseudo private values whenever it is possible. We use again a triweight kernel for K m (·) in ( When considering the pooling of pseudo private values for n = 2 and n = 3, let L 2T and L 3T be the number of auctions remaining after trimming for auctions with two and three bidders, respectively.
The estimated pooled marginal densityf P (·) is given bŷ
where h P f = c P f (2L 2T + 3L 3T ) −1/16 and c P = 2.978 × 1.06σv withσv is the empirical standard deviation of the (2L 2T + 3L 3T ) pseudo private values.
Results
16 If the order of differentiability of f (v1, v2, v3) is R, then the order of differentiability of the cumulative distribution F(v1, v2, v3) and hence of F(v1, v2) = F(v1, v2, v) is R + 3. Therefore, the order of differentiability of f (v1, v2) is R + 1.
This section summarizes our findings regarding the performance of our procedure in terms of estimation of the equilibrium strategies, the marginal density of private values and the informational rents left to the winners. We also assess the consequences of estimating an IPV model from observed bids when the latter are generated from an APV model. As indicated above, our results are based on 1,000 replications of the experimental design and the estimation procedure. That is, for each replication (100 simulated auctions with two bidders and 100 simulated auctions with three bidders), we apply exactly the procedure described in the preceding subsection. The program has been written in FORTRAN and takes less than 3 seconds for each replication on a 600Mhz PC.
Equilibrium strategies. We first consider the equilibrium strategy, which is an important feature in auction theory. For each replication and each size n, our procedure delivers an estimate of the inverse equilibrium strategy ξ(·) from n × 100 simulated bids. Specifically, we consider 50 equally spaced values b k , k = 1, . . . , 50 between 0 and s(1) at which we computeξ(·). This gives 1,000
estimates at each point b k through the 1,000 replications of the estimation procedure. For each value b k , we choose to represent the median of the 1,000ξ(b k ), the 5 percentile as well as the 95 percentile. In particular, the latter two percentiles provide a (pointwise) 90% confidence interval for ξ(·).
For comparison, we also represent the true inverse equilibrium strategy s −1 (·) obtained from (10), (11) and (12) for n = 2 and n = 3. Though not on the same figure, we can see that the inverse bidding strategy for n = 3 is everywhere below that for n = 2. This is a competition effect since bidders tend to bid more agressively in three bidders auctions than in two bidders ones given the same private value. This result is specific to our experimental design. Pinkse and Tan (2000) have shown through a generic example that bidding strategies may decrease as n increases, i.e. that bidders can bid less agressively as competition increases in the APV model. This striking result sharply contrasts with the well-known property that bids increase with competition in the IPV model, a property that has been frequently used in the past to dismiss the private value paradigm in favor of a common value model. See Porter (1995) .
Figures 1 and 2 display the above functions for n = 2 and n = 3, respectively. On average over the 1,000 replications, the bandwidth h G and h g are equal to .148 and .177 for n = 2 and .076 and .122 for n = 3, respectively. Both figures display increasing estimated ξ(·) functions, which is in agreement with Proposition 1. In each case, the median is very close to the true inverse equilibirum strategy though perhaps slightly higher. This implies that we may overestimate slightly the bidders' private values. The confidence intervals are quite narrow, especially given the small sample sizes. We also note that the true inverse equilibrium strategy lies within the 90% confidence interval except possibly close to the boundaries, especially for large values of bids. On the other hand, the inverse equilibrium strategy is very well estimated on the interval [h g , s(1) − h g ] for each n, which corresponds to the trimming (14).
Marginal density of private values.
For each replication and each n, the marginal density f (·) is estimated using (9) at 50 equally spaced values v k , k = 1, . . . , 50 on the interval [0, 1]. As before, we obtain 1,000 estimates forf (v k ). For each value v k , we then represent the median of these 1,000
estimates, the 5 percentile and the 95 percentile as well as the true marginal density of private values in figures 3 and 4 for n = 2 and n = 3, respectively. On average, the bandwidths h m are equal to .234 for n = 2 and .233 for n = 3. The median tracks quite well the true density except near the boundaries. Also, the median somewhat underestimates the peak of the true marginal density at v = .5. This is not surprising as the density is not differentiable at this point, while nonparametric estimators smooth out kinks of the density. Moreover, the true density falls within the confidence interval almost everywhere.
In our experimental design, the marginal density f (·) is independent of n. Hence we can pool the pseudo private values obtained from auctions with two and three bidders to estimate the marginal density of private values using (15). On average, the bandwidth h P is equal to .220. Figure 5 displays the median, the 90% confidence interval for f (·) as well as the true marginal density of private values. The same comments apply. Moreover, the confidence interval tends to be narrower, which is expected given the larger number of observed bids and hence pseudo private values used in the estimation of the density.
Winners' informational rents. One of the main advantages of the structural approach is to recover bidders' private values or willingnesses to pay. In particular, they can be used to assess the informational rents left to the winners. In percentage, the informational rent left to the winner in the th auction is defined as
where v w and b w are the private value and the bid of the winner. Our procedure provides a good estimate of v w through (7) (14). Table 1 provides the mean of these 1,000 averages as well as their 5th and 95th
percentiles.
In both cases, we slightly overestimate the true mean informational rent, which can be explained by the slight overestimation of the inverse equilibrium strategy in Figures 1 and 2 . Moreover, the latter falls within the 90% confidence interval. We also note that the informational rents are lower for auctions with 3 bidders than for auctions for 2 bidders because of the competition effect found in the equilibrium strategies. It is in the interest of the seller to decrease these informational rents.
For instance, this can be accomplished by introducing a reservation price in the auction. See Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2001) for how to estimate the optimal reserve price from observed bids in an APV model.
Estimating incorrectly an IPV model. Lastly, it is interesting to assess the consequences of misspecifying the auction structure, such as estimating an IPV model while private values are actually affiliated as in our experimental design. Though it is possible to test for independence of bids using for instance the Blum, Kiefer and Rosenblatt (1961) test, we suppose that the analyst has not done so and thus applies the procedure developed in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) for analyzing the preceding observed bids. On average over the 1,000 replications, the bandwidths h g and h f defined there are equal to .200 and .165 for n = 2 and .122 and .244 for n = 3, respectively.
Figures 6 and 7 display the true inverse equilibrium strategies corresponding to the APV model as well as the median of the 1,000 estimated ξ(·) function obtained from (3) in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) with its 90% confidence interval for n = 2 and n = 3, respectively. In figure 6 we observe that the equilibrium strategy is perfectly estimated whenever private values are smaller than .5. This is not surprising since the equilibrium strategy for an IPV model with the triangular marginal density of our experimental design is exactly identical to the equilibrium strategy in our APV model, i.e. b = s(v) = 2v/3 for v ≤ .5 and n = 2. On the other hand, for higher private values the inverse equilibrium strategy estimated under the incorrect IPV model is significantly above the true one. Figure 7 for n = 3 is similar to figure 6 except that the inverse equilibrium strategy for private values smaller than .5 is somewhat below the true one. Intuitively, when there is affiliation, a bidder with a low private value will expect that other bidders will have likely low private values and hence will bid less agressively relative to the situation where his private value is independent form others' private values. 17 In contrast, when a bidder has a high private value, he anticipates that other bidders have high private values too and hence will have to bid more agressively than when private values are independent. This explain the crossing of the curves in figures 7.
Overall, figures 6 and 7 indicate that the analyst will overestimate bidders' private values by using an IPV specification. This translates into larger estimated informational rents as shown in Table 2 . The first line reproduces the true informational rents. On average we overestimate the informational rents by 17% and 24% under independence of private values when n = 2 and n = 3, respectively. This is not negligeable and can produce misleading policy conclusions.
It remains to assess the consequences of incorrectly assuming independence of private values on the estimation of the latent density of private values. Figures 8 and 9 display the true marginal density, the median over 1,000 replications of the estimate of f (·) under an IPV assumption and its 90% confidence interval. For each replication, the estimate of f (·) is obtained by applying Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) . The effect is striking as the true density does not lie within the confidence interval over a large proportion of the support. This is due to the fact that using an IPV model overestimates private values when they are large and underestimates them when they are small.
Conclusion
This paper develops a methodology for the structural estimation of the APV model from observed bids. This model is interesting because it includes a large class of models that allows dependence among bidders' private values through affiliation. As such, our paper contributes to the growing literature on the structural analysis of auction data, which has been mainly confined to the pure common value and the independent private value models. Consequently, the methods we propose can be used to reexamine many auction data that have been extensively analyzed within either one of these two paradigms. In particular, we show that the APV model is identified from observed bids, and we characterize the restrictions it imposes on the bid distribution. We then propose a consistent and computationally convenient two-step nonparametric procedure for estimating the underlying joint density of private values. We illustrate our procedure on simulated bids data and we assess the accuracy of our estimates of the equilibrium strategy, the latent marginal density of private values and the winners' informational rents.
To conclude, we indicate the main pros and cons of our method. A first advantage is that our method does not require a parametric specification of the underlying joint density of private values as it lets the data reveal the underlying distribution. In particular, it does not impose a specific form for the affiliation among private values, which is typically unknown to the analyst. In addition, our method does not require the computation of the equilibrium strategy. Except possibly for very simple parametric specifications, obtaining an explicit form for the equilibrium strategy, which is required in direct structural methods such as in maximum likelihood based methods (see Donald and Paarsch (1996) within the IPV paradigm), is impossible in general. As the revenue equivalence no longer holds with affiliated private values, simulation-based methods as in Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) do not reduce significantly the computational burden. In contrast, our method is straightforward and extremely fast computationally.
Regarding data requirements, our experiments suggest that our estimators perform well on small samples. On the other hand, our method has to be applied separately for each size n of bidders.
This implies that there should be enough auctions with the same number of bidders as we need to estimate the bivariate density of (B, b) sufficiently well. Note, however, that this dimensionality is independent of n. Moreover, the data requirement is alleviated when interest focuses on the estimation of the marginal density of private values as the number of bidders increases. Nonparametric estimation of a univariate density typically requires a minimum of 100 observations. This can be satisfied with 50 auctions with 2 bidders but only 25 auctions with 4 bidders. Lastly, as noted in the paper, our method readily accomodates observed characteristics Z of the auctioned objects by conditioning all the distributions in each step upon Z = z. In this case, as in nonparametric estimation in general, this would require more data because of the curse of dimensionality.
This means that one should minimize the number of object characteristics to be entertained. The use of parametric estimators in each step can mitigate these data requirements associated with nonparametric estimators.
The appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1 to 3 as well as technical assumptions. (1) which can be rewritten as (4). Therefore Therefore the symmetric APV model is identified.
Proof of Proposition
Now we prove the sufficient and necessary condition under which a symmetric affiliated distribution G(·) can be rationalized by a symmetric APV model. We first prove necessity. Let 
Now we construct a joint distribution F(·) as F(ξ(·, G) ). Hence it suffices to show that ξ −1 (·, G) solves (1) with the boundary condition ξ −1 (v, G) = v. It is easy to verify that this boundary condition is satisfied. From the construction of F(·), note that
differentiating and taking the ratio. Thus ξ −1 (·, G) solves (1) if v, v] . But this clearly holds by definition of ξ(·, G) and its inverse.
Finally, we need to show that F(·) is a symmetric affiliated distribution. The symmetry of F(·)
is straightfowardly obtained from the definition of F(·) and the symmetry of G(·). To prove the affiliated property of F(·), it suffices to apply Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Weber (1982) given that
Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3. We make the following assumptions on the data generating process and the kernels. (ii) F(v 1 , . . . , v n ) has R + n, R ≥ 1, continuous bounded partial derivatives on [v, v] n , with density
Assumption A2: ·, . . . , ·) and K m (·) are symmetric with bounded hypercube supports of sides equal to 2, and continuous bounded first derivatives, ·, . . . , ·) and K m (·) are of order R + n − 2, R + n − 2, R, and R + n − 1 respectively, i.e. moments of order strictly smaller than the given order vanish.
As in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) , the proof proceeds in three parts for each proposition.
a) The goal of the first part is to establish the regularity of the bid distribution and density appearing in the inverse equilibrium strategy (4). To do so we need a series of lemmas.
The next lemma derives the regularity properties of the joint density of interest f (·, . . . , ·) as (ỹ, v) dỹ and the joint density f yv (·, ·) of (y, v), which appear in the equilibrium strategy (2).
Lemma A1: Given Assumption A1, (i) f (·, . . . , ·) and f (·) have R and R + n − 1 continuous bounded derivatives on [v, v] n and [v, v] , respectively.
(ii) F y×v (·, ·) has (R + n − 1) continuous bounded derivatives on its support [v, v] 
Proof of Lemma A1. The first part of (i) is immediate from Assumption A1, while the second part follows from f (v) = ∂F (v, v, . . . , v) /∂v. Let F yv (·, ·) denote the joint cdf of (y 1 , v 1 ). Its support is [v, v] 
The next lemma establishes the regularity of the equilibrium strategy (2).
Lemma A2: Given Assumption A1, (i) s(·) admits (R + n − 1) continuous bounded derivatives on any compact subset of (v, v] .
(ii) s(·) admits up to (R + 1) continuous bounded derivatives on [v, v] , and s (·) ≥ c s > 0. (y, v) . Because of Assumption A1-(ii), F y×v (y, v) = 0 if and only if y = v. Hence, from Lemma A1 it follows that λ (y, v) has (R + n − 2) continuous bounded derivatives on any compact subset of (v, v] 
To prove (ii), note that
Without loss of generality, let v = 0. Using a R-th order Taylor expansion of f (·, . . . , ·) around (0, . . . , 0) gives
,
Using this expansion to obtain another for L(α|v), some straightforward algebra from (2) establishes that (ii) ξ(·) admits up to (R + 1) continuous bounded derivatives on [b, b] , and ξ (·) ≥ c ξ > 0.
Proof of Lemma A3. Using Lemma A2, the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma A2-(ii) in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) . Q.E.D.
The next proposition establishes the regularity of the bid distribution and density, appearing
is the joint density of (B, b) Proof of Proposition A1. Because the joint cdf of (B, b) satisfies
b) The goal of the second part is to establish the uniform convergence and rates of convergence of the pseudo private valuesv i to the true values v i . We need some lemmas.
The next lemma considers the biases and variances of our nonparametric estimators (5), (6), and of the infeasible kernel density estimatorsf (·, . . . , ·) andf (·) given by (8) and (9) using the true v i instead of the pseudo valuesv i . To simplify the notation, herafter we drop the subscript n from e.g. f n (·), L n etc. Let C 1 and C 2 be arbitrary but fixed inner compact subsets of [b, b] and [v, v] , respectively. We also need to consider an expanding subset of [b, b] , namely,
Lemma A4: Given Assumptions A1-A2,
Proof of Lemma A4. The proof is standard using Proposition A1-(i)-(ii), and Lemma A1-(i). See e.g. Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000, Lemmas C2 and C3) . Q.E.D.
The next lemma establishes the uniform consistency and rates of convergence of the nonpara-
Proof of Lemma A5: In view of Proposition A1-(i), the bandwidth rates for h G and h g are optimal for estimating G B×b and g Bb , respectively. Hence the first two equalities in (i) follow. For the last two equalities of (i) and the two equalities in (ii), it suffices to verify that the chosen bandwidth rates imply oversmoothing. That is, using Lemma A4, the square-root of the variance is of order of magnitude smaller than the bias, which therefore dictates the rate of uniform convergence. For a rigorous proof using exponential type inequalities, see e.g. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000,
Lemma B2). Q.E.D.
The next proposition establishes the rates of convergence of the pseudo private valuesv i to the true values v i . Let b min and b max be the smallest and largest of all bids b i . Letv i be given by (7) if
and be +∞ otherwise.
Proposition A2: Under the assumptions of Lemma A5,
).
(
is an increasing continuous function, C 1 is an inner compact subset of [b, b] . Thus, Hencev p = ∞ implies b p ∈ C L . Thus we have to zero on C n 2 at the rate h R f . We shall prove that the first term converges uniformly to zero on C n 2 at the same rate.
As in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000, Theorem 3), let C 2 and C 2 be compact subsets such that C 2 ⊂ C 2 ⊂ C 2 ⊂ [b, b] , where all inclusions are strict. Now, for v ∈ C n 2 and L large enough, f (v) uses at most pseudo valuesv in C 2 n because of assumption A2-(i), and hence for which v is in C 2 n by Proposition A2-(ii), provided R > n − 2 as assumed. Becausef (v) uses at most v in C 2 n , we havef
Now, for v ∈ C n 2 , a first-order Taylor expansion gives for some v *
∂v .
Thus, Proposition A2-(i) implies that sup . We shall prove that the first term converges uniformly to zero on C 2 at the same rate.
As in Part c), we have for v ∈ C 2
Now, for v ∈ C 2 , a first-order Taylor expansion gives for some
Thus, Proposition A2-(i) implies that sup C 2 |f ( 
